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The rapid integration of China into the global economy has profoundly altered external 
economic conditions for its neighbors and the wider developing world. This study 
explores the effects on Laos, a small developing country on the fringe of the Chinese 
market. The Lao case captures both global effects transmitted across the world market 
and a regional impact that may be limited to countries located close to China. Based on 
unique trade and household data-sets, the study identifies three main effects of China’s 
growth on the Lao economy: (i) an increased demand for exports of primary commodities 
to the Chinese market; (ii) increased inflows of Chinese manufactured goods competing 
with domestic Lao production; and (iii) border effects in northern Laos where low 
transaction costs have allowed even the poorest households to participate in exports to 
China. The first and second of these effects are expected to apply to most developing 
countries, whereas the third is unique to developing countries located close to the Chinese 
market. In the long run, it is possible that increasing wages and a gradual reduction of the 
Chinese surplus of unskilled labor will create new opportunities for labor intensive 
industry in other developing countries, but the short run strategies of many countries 
should probably focus on gradual upgrading of resource based industries. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of the reform program known as the New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM) in November 1986, Lao PDR has been in a slow transition from a centrally 
planned economy towards a market economy. Various measures have been introduced 
under the NEM to reduce price and production controls, improve the managerial and 
financial autonomy of state-owned enterprises, and promote the development of a private 
sector. Openness and outward orientation have been stressed as central policy objectives, 
and simplification and liberalization of trade and exchange rate regulations have 
contributed to a more transparent environment for both export and import activities. 
These unilateral reforms were strengthened by the country’s accession to ASEAN’s Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1997, which has gradually improved access to the regional 
export market at the same time as it has reduced the import tariffs towards other AFTA 
members. The negotiations for WTO membership, which commenced in 1997, have also 
helped clarify the country’s trade policy ambitions. Like many other countries, Lao PDR 
sees globalization – in the form of international trade and foreign direct investment 
inflows – as a vehicle for economic growth and development.  
 
So far, the results of the market oriented reforms have been encouraging, although Lao 
PDR remains one of the poorest countries in East Asia. Development has accelerated 
since the late 1980s, and the average annual GDP growth rate for the past two decades 
exceeds six percent. Over the same period, the poverty rate has fallen from nearly 50 
percent to less than 30 percent.  
 
One of the characteristics distinguishing Lao PDR from most other developing countries 
is its geographical location next to China. Being a neighbor to China highlights both the 
opportunities and challenges of globalization: the huge Chinese market is within reach of 
many Lao producers and could potentially swallow any amount of exports from Laos, at 
the same time as the threat from Chinese exports is ubiquitous. Another distinguishing 
mark of the Lao economy is the strong fragmentation of the national market. The low 
  1population density (only 24 people per square kilometer) together with mountainous 
geography and severely underdeveloped transport infrastructure mean that domestic 
market integration is weak. Hence, while the northern part of Laos is located close to 
China, the southern part is not, in an economic sense. It is more expensive to transport 
goods from southern Laos to China, by road or via Thai or Vietnamese ports, than to ship 
goods to China from major ports in South Asia or even Africa. As we will see, trade with 
China has contributed significantly to the economic development of Laos, but the 
Chinese footprint has looked different in different parts of the country. 
 
The particular features of the Lao market mean that the experiences of Lao PDR can be 
used to illustrate two kinds of trade relations with China. The northern part of the country 
has had ample opportunities to engage in border trade in a wide variety of products, 
thanks to relatively low entry barriers in terms of transport and transactions costs. 
Southern Lao PDR, by contrast, has faced higher costs in its trade with China, which has 
limited the range of products that can be exported and imported. If the first of these cases 
is described as “integration”, the second one illustrates “internationalization”.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the development of international trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Lao PDR, with focus on the relations with China. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the structure of trade and FDI in Laos. Section 3 looks 
more specifically at the relations with China, highlights the differences between northern 
and southern Laos, and discusses the effects on poverty reduction and income 
distribution. This discussion focuses on the period 1997/98-2002/03, for which detailed 
data are available from comprehensive living standard surveys: it is likely that the 
differences between the northern and southern parts of the country will diminish over 
time, as the as the north catches up to the the rest of the country. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Trade policy, international trade, and FDI in Lao PDR 
During the first decade after the introduction of the NEM, Lao trade policy remained 
fairly restrictive and non-transparent in spite of some unilateral attempts at market 
  2oriented reform. The tariff structure was complicated and import duties on many products 
were high, various exemptions and reductions were frequently applied, and a large 
number of non-tariff measures (such as foreign exchange controls and import licensing 
requirements) were in place, as well as various taxes and fees on exports (World Bank 
2006; UNDP 2006). A more comprehensive reform process started in the mid-1990s, 
when a number of regional and multilateral initiatives were added to the cautious 
unilateral reforms. The most important of these initiatives was the accession of Laos to 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1997. The objective of AFTA is to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers in the trade 
between member countries, and to promote economic efficiency and competitiveness 
through increased competition, specialization, and opportunities to exploit scale 
economies. By 2005, the five original ASEAN nations – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and the Philippines – had in principle reduced their tariffs on intra-regional 
trade below five percent. Laos reached the same target in 2008.
1 ASEAN has also been 
an important vehicle for simplifying trade with China. For instance, the Early Harvest 
Program of the trade agreement between ASEAN and China has reduced Chinese import 
tariffs on many agricultural commodities in advance of the free trade agreement, which is 
expected to come into force in 2010 for the more developed ASEAN countries and in 
2015 for Laos.   
 
Other important agreements guarantee market access in the main OECD markets. Laos 
has been included among EU’s GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) partners since 
the early 1990s, and tariffs on Lao exports have therefore been well below MFN (most 
Favored Nation) tariffs. These preferences were particularly important for the early 
development of the Lao garment industry (UNDP 2006). Since 2002, Lao exporters have 
benefited from the Everything But Arms program, which provides duty-free access to the 
Single Market for almost all exports from Least Developed Countries. Access to the 
Japanese market is also facilitated by GSP preferences, although these preferences are 
lower than in the EU market, and rules of origin appear to be a more substantial problem 
(World Bank 2006). Trade with the US is governed by a BTA (Bilateral Trade 
Agreement) from 2004 that grants Laos normal trade relations, meaning access to US 
  3market on MFN terms. Unlike the GSP programs of the EU and Japan, this bilateral 
agreement does not provide any preferences beyond MFN, and requires Laos to 
undertake a number of reforms in the trade area. These reforms are intended to simplify 
trade regulations and improve access to the Lao market for US and other foreign 
investors. The requirements in the US agreement are broadly consistent with WTO 
regulations, and the BTA can therefore be seen as an important step towards WTO 
membership. Laos applied for WTO membership in 1997, but the negotiations did not 
commence until 2004 and are only progressing slowly. 
 
As a result of these bilateral and multilateral agreements, the trade policy environment 
has become significantly less restrictive during the past decade. World Bank (2006) notes 
that “MFN import duties in Laos are low and not highly dispersed”, with only six rates in 
the tariff schedule (in the range 5-40 percent) and an unweighted average tariff of around 
10 percent. Official policy also supports exports. In addition to efforts aiming to 
encourage locally owned firms to produce for the regional and global market, the 
government has provided favorable conditions for export oriented foreign investors in 
areas like textiles and garments, hydropower, mining, wood products, and commercial 
agriculture. This notwithstanding, non-tariff barriers remain a concern, with cumbersome 
procedures both on the import and export side, as well as problems with implementation 
of regulations and coverage of trade statistics. A large share of trade – in particular border 
trade – is informal and therefore not registered in official statistics. For obvious reasons, 
it is difficult to assess exactly what share of overall trade is unregistered, but it can be 
noted that UNDP reports that at least 20-30 percent of overall trade goes unregistered, 
with substantially higher shares for agricultural exports in border regions (UNDP 2006). 
 
The trade reforms, together with price liberalization and other domestic reforms, have 
supported growth and development and also led to a substantial increase in trade volumes 
over the past decade. Figure 1 illustrates the development of Lao exports and imports 
since the early 1990, and highlights two points. Firstly, the increase in trade volumes, 
particularly during the past few years, is notable even taking into account the fact that 
much trade remains unregistered. The nominal values of exports and imports have more 
  4than doubled in the past five years and tripled in the past ten years. This has raised the 
ratio of trade to GDP from well below 20 percent in the early 1990s to around 30 percent 
in 2006-07. Yet, trade volumes remain low, reflecting low productivity and income 
levels. To put the aggregate amounts in perspective, it can be noted that Lao exports per 
capita reached USD 130 in 2005, which can be compared to some  USD 550 USD per 
capita in China or nearly USD 400 per capita in Vietnam.  
 






























Source: IMF Country Reports (various issues).  
 
Secondly, Figures 1 illustrates Lao PDR’s persistent trade deficits. Goods imports have 
consistently been larger than exports, and revenues from services like tourism and 
overflight rights have not been sufficient to finance the deficits in goods trade. The 
deficits have instead been financed by steady inflows of official development assistance 
and remittances from Lao citizens working abroad, in particular in Thailand. In an 
historical perspective, it is interesting to note that it is hard to find any year since the late 
19
th century with a Lao trade surplus. During the colonial period, there was a net inflow 
of resources to the country from France and other parts of Indochina, various political 
groups in Laos were supported by the parties in the Indochinese Wars between the 1940s 
and the 1970s, substantial support from Vietnam continued for more than a decade after 
the communist takeover in 1975, and the international aid community has provided 
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early 1990s, official development assistance has fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent of 
GDP, which makes Laos one of the most aid dependent countries in Asia. 
 
Trade partners and trade structure 
Although Lao PDR has been politically dependent on Vietnam since 1975, when the 
current regime came to power with support from Vietnam, there is no doubt that the most 
important economic relationships are with Thailand. These relationships have not only 
been facilitated by similarities in culture and language (Lao and Thai are closely related), 
but also by geography. A large share of the Lao population is found along the Mekong 
river, which forms the border to Thailand, whereas the areas bordering to Vietnam, 
China, and Cambodia have been more sparsely populated (although all border provinces 
record faster population growth than the inland provinces). The first bridge over the 
Mekong river was not opened until 1994, but the river itself and its tributaries form an 
important transport network that links large parts of Laos to Thailand. The transport 
infrastructure in other border regions is weaker, although regional infrastructure projects 
like the East-West Corridor that links northeastern Thailand to Danang in central 
Vietnam (via central Lao PDR) and the North-South Corridor connecting northern 
Thailand to China’s Yunnan province (via Luang Namtha and Bokeo provinces in Laos), 
have improved the situation. Yet, for most Lao producers, it is less costly to trade with 
Thailand than with the other neighboring countries (Edmonds and Fujimura 2008). 
Hence, Thailand has accounted for most of Lao exports and imports. EU and Vietnam are 
other important export destinations, but China has been relatively insignificant, at least 
according to officially registered statistics. On the import side, China and Vietnam are the 
second and third largest trade partners, but remain far behind Thailand.  
 
Given the low level of development of Laos, it is not surprising that the structure of 
exports is heavily biased toward primary products. With nearly half of the country’s land 
area under forest cover, timber and wood products have traditionally been the most 
important export goods. In recent years, official timber exports have been reduced 
because of environmental concerns, but wood products from forest plantations remain 
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farming, the agricultural sector has not been very important in officially registered 
exports. The main exception is coffee, which was introduced to central and southern Laos 
by the French already in the early 20
th century. Exports became important in the 1980s, 
when coffee was used to repay debts to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. These exports 
were mainly made up of unroasted beans of low quality, and sales stagnated when trade 
with the communist block fell away towards the end of the decade. A recovery has taken 
place since the mid-1990s, and larger integrated firms (with plantations as well as 
capacity for roasting, milling, and packaging) have begun to replace the small coffee 
farmers that dominated in the past (Andersson et al. 2007). Although other cash crops – 
e.g. sugar cane, maize, and rubber – have been introduced in recent years through foreign 
direct investment projects based on large land concessions, agriculture remains a small 
part of formal exports. However, it should be noted that farm products and non-timber 
forest products are important parts of the informal border trade between Laos and its 
neighbors. 
 
The mountainous geography and the Mekong river with its many tributaries also gives 
Laos very notable hydroelectric potential. Electricity exports have been important since 
the late 1990s and several ongoing hydropower projects will increase the sector’s export 
capacity in the future. Similarly, mining has become an important export sector in recent 
years. Lao PDR has substantial reserves of gold, copper, tin, zinc, gypsum, sapphires, and 
other minerals, and although only a few major mines are in operation at present, there is a 
large number of mining concessions in the early stages of exploration and investment 
(Shingu 2006).  
 
Aside from wood products, textiles, garments, and footwear make up the most important 
manufacturing exports. The main importer of textiles and garments is the EU: as noted 
earlier, the origins of the industry lie in EU trade preferences and export quotas under the 
MFA (Multi-Fiber Agreement). The expiration of the MFA at the end of 2004 has put 
pressure on many of the producers in Lao PDR (primarily foreign investors) who are less 
competitive than the leading Chinese producers. The introduction of new quotas for 
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country exporters, but the medium term prospects for Laos are not very positive. 
 
The main export sectors are also the main sectors of interest for inward FDI, which is not 
surprising considering the small size and purchasing power of the country’s domestic 
market. The first substantial foreign investments were made in the garment and wood 
products industries in the early 1990s, telecommunications and hydropower took over 
some years later, and mining emerged as a major investment sector around the turn of the 
millennium. In the past few years, agriculture has also appeared among the sectors with 
substantial FDI: several large land concessions have been granted to foreign investors for 
forest plantations, rubber, maize, sugarcane, rice, and other commodities.  
 
The official trade statistics collected by Lao authorities do not provide any accurate 
description of the structure of imports and exports. The main reasons are the weak 
capacity of the statistical authorities in Laos and the high share of informal trade, which 
is partly facilitated (or caused) by an inefficient customs administration. The fact that 
much trade if informal makes it difficult to double-check the Lao export records by 
examining import data from the country’s trade partners: the lack of formal export and 
import records spills over to the trade statistics of the neighboring countries. Hence, there 
are substantial discrepancies between the export data recorded by the Lao Ministry of 
Trade (see e.g. IMF 2000) and the import data registered by the trade partners of Laos.
2 
These discrepancies do not follow any systematic pattern – some years, partner data show 
much lower trade volumes than official Lao records, other years the opposite is true.  
 
In particular, it is difficult to describe the country structure of Lao trade. As noted earlier, 
Laos is a landlocked country and virtually all traded goods have to pass through one of 
the neighboring countries. In most cases, the transit country is Thailand, but some exports 
are also routed via ports in central Vietnam (mainly Danang). Even if export and import 
volumes are accurately registered at the border, there is a risk that the final destinations or 
origins of the goods are lost, and the transactions are recorded as trade with Thailand or 
Vietnam. For example, Lao statistics suggest that about 65 percent of exports in 1997 
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imply that their combined share of Lao exports was below 35 percent: the difference is 
probably re-exports to overseas locations. Although it is difficult to determine the exact 
shares of specific countries, it is possible to use this type of data to illustrate changes over 
time. This is done in Figure 2, which uses partner import statistics to show how the shares 
of four important export destinations – Thailand, Vietnam, China, and the European 
Union (EU) – have changed over time. The most notable point in Figure 2 is the very low 
share of China, which did not reach 1 percent of Lao exports until 2005. Another 
interesting observation is the reduction in the share of the EU and the increase in the 
share of Thailand during the past decade.  
 
































Source: IMF Country Reports (various issues) for total exports, UN Comtrade for imports 
by trade partners.  
 
The commodity composition of Lao trade is easier to observe at border stations, and it is 
likely that these data are more useful than those on the direction of trade. In particular, it 
is easier to discern which commodity groups are underrepresented in official statistics. A 
major share of informal trade is likely to involve agricultural products and timber on the 
export side, and consumer goods on the import side: trade in minerals, electricity, fuel 
and capital goods is probably captured reasonably well, because it is undertaken by larger 
  9firms that are more visible to the authorities. Table 1 summarizes the commodity 
composition of exports and imports during the period 1998-2006. The changes on the 
export side are significant. Electricity, timber, and garments were the main export 
products throughout the 1990s, and they remain important. Electricity is expected to keep 
its position as new hydropower projects come on line in the future. The mining industry 
has developed quickly since 2003, with gold and copper now accounting for nearly half 
of Lao exports. Official exports of timber have fallen because of stricter logging 
restrictions, but it is likely that substantial informal exports still occur. Four commodities 
– gold, copper, timber, and coffee – account for almost three-quarters of official exports.  
 
The main development on the import side is a strong increase in the share of investment 
goods. The relatively favorable economic conditions during the past half-decade 
(including the high world market prices for raw materials and energy) have stimulated 
investment, not least in the mining sector, and boosted the imports of capital goods. 
Consequently, over two-thirds of official imports can be classified as investment goods or 
intermediates. The low share of consumer good imports is partly explained by the low 
incomes (and demand) of the population and partly by high informal imports of consumer 
goods from Thailand and China. 
 
Table 1. Commodity composition of trade, Lao PDR, 2000-2006 (per cent) 
 
Major  commodity  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports (% or total recorded exports) 
Gold  0 0 0 0 0  13  12  14  10 
Copper  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  17  36 
Electricity    20 25 33 29 28 19 18 17 11 
Timber  34 29 20 29 31 28 29 21 17 
Garments  21 20 31 31 31 29 31 21 11 
Coffee  14  4 4 4 5 2 3 3 1 
Other  11  22  12  6 6 8 7 6  13 
Imports (% of total recorded imports) 
Petroleum    22 13 22 13 16 13 11 13 13 
Capital  goods  37 33 33 35 31 39 48 51 41 
Garment  materials    12 12  9  13 13 12 12  9  6 
Electricity    1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Other  28 40 35 38 40 34 27 25 36 
Source: IMF Country Reports (various issues). 
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Foreign direct investment inflows 
A large part of the investment boom in Lao PDR is related to foreign direct investment. 
As shown in Figure 3, the annual net inflows of FDI have increased very substantially in 
recent years, from around USD 50 million in the aftermath of the Asian crisis to about 
USD 300 million in 2004-2006, and over 700 million in 2007. It should be noted that 
these are figures for realized net FDI, as reported in the country’s balance-of-payments: 
the value of foreign direct investment licenses approved during the period 1995-2006 was 
about four times higher. Although the gap between licensed investment and realized 
investment is large, it is not remarkable compared to other developing countries opening 
up to foreign direct investment (see e.g. Kokko and Zejan 1996). The risk levels in FDI 
projects are high, and license applications are typically based on best-case scenarios that 
are rarely realized in the short run. 
 
































Source: IMF Country Reports (various issues). 
 
There are no readily available data on the source country and industry distribution of 
realized FDI, but Table 2 summarizes some data on the distribution of investment 
licenses for the periods 1996-2000 and 2002-2007. The main FDI license holders during 
the ten-year period covered by the data were Thailand and the other ASEAN countries 
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increase in the Chinese share towards the end of the period. It is likely that China is now 
the largest foreign investor in Laos, even though the data on license approvals may 
underestimate the role of EU and Thai investors, who have often recorded a smaller gap 
between license approvals and actual investment amounts than investors from other 
countries (ADB 2006). Chinese FDI in Laos is mainly focused on commodities, and 
forms part of the Chinese drive to secure access to raw materials like minerals, 
agricultural raw materials, rubber, and other forest products. Once these investments 
come on line, they will result in an increase also in the share of Lao exports that are 
directed to China. 
 
Table 2. Country and industry distribution of approved FDI (per cent) 
 
 1996-2000  2002-2007 
Country distribution of approved FDI  %  % 
Thailand 50  22 
China 2  19 
Vietnam n.a.  9 
France 0  7 
Japan 1  7 
India n.a.  6 
Australia 1  5 
Korea 18  5 
Malaysia 18  2 
Singapore 1  2 
Others 10  17 
Industry distribution of approved FDI     
Agriculture 4  12 
Mining 1  10 
Electricity 15  53 
Construction n.a.  3 
Manufacturing 23  7 
Hotel and restaurant  14  3 
Other, including telecommunications   43  12 
Source: IMF Country Reports (various issues). 
 
Looking more broadly at the industry distribution of FDI licenses, there is a clear shift 
between the 1990s and the last few years. During the 1990s, most foreign investors 
focused on garments, telecommunications, and electricity generation. The first two of 
these industries have lost shares over time, since the competitiveness of the garment 
  12industry has suffered from the expiration of the MFA and the telecommunications 
network has been put in place. At the same time, mining, electricity generation and 
agriculture have become more important. Taken together, these three industries 
accounted for 75 percent of the approved inward FDI 2002-2007. There are no records of 
outward FDI from Laos, which is consistent with the weak development of Lao industry.  
 
3. Trade and FDI relations between Laos and China  
The officially recorded bilateral trade between Laos and China is relatively small. China 
accounted for less than 1 per cent of Lao exports before 2005, but its share has been 
rising fast since then: in 2007, the Chinese share exceeded 5 percent for the first time 
since the start of economic reforms. The Chinese share of official imports has been 
higher during most of this period, and exceeded 10 percent in 2006. Consequently, Laos 
has recorded a notable deficit in its trade relations with China. As Figure 4 shows, the 
deficit started growing rapidly in the late 1990s, and has averaged nearly USD 100 
million per year since 2003. 
 




























Source: Comtrade (based on data on Chinese exports and imports). 
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both Chinese consumer goods and capital goods are much more abundant in the Lao 
market than what official statistics suggest – unregistered imports are common – and 
there are also substantial informal exports to China, particularly from the northern 
provinces of the country.  
 
The penetration of Chinese products is not surprising. China is not only a neighboring 
country, but also the world’s leading exporter of low-cost manufacturing goods, and 
should therefore be expected to hold a large share of the Lao market. This has positive as 
well as negative effects on the Lao economy. The abundant supply of cheap Chinese 
goods has undoubtedly raised the welfare of Lao consumers throughout the country. In 
particular, it is interesting to observe how cheap Chinese generators, satellite disks, and 
television sets can now be found in many remote villages that lack permanent road 
connections to the outside world. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the 
proximity to China puts domestic manufacturing industry in a difficult position. With a 
small domestic market and a very limited supply of skilled workers, Lao manufacturing 
industries will find it very hard to match their Chinese competitors unless they can rely 
on some sort of institutional advantage (e.g. strong import protection or preferential 
access to third-country markets). In its trade with China, Laos is therefore an importer of 
manufactured goods and an exporter of commodities. Manufactured goods (mainly 
machinery and equipment) account for over 90 percent of registered imports from China, 
while a similar share of exports to China is raw materials – mainly agricultural products, 
timber, rubber, and recently also minerals. 
 
Northern versus southern Laos 
An important feature of trade with China is that its importance and character varies 
between the regions of the country. In the central and southern parts of Laos, Chinese 
goods meet tough competition from products from Thailand and Vietnam. In particular, 
Thai and Vietnamese producers have been able to capture large shares of light consumer 
goods, while the Chinese appear to be more competitive in durable consumer goods and 
capital goods. In the northern part of the country, imports from China have higher market 
  14shares across the board. Although not shown clearly in official statistics, this includes 
substantial (informal) imports of food and beverages and various light consumer goods.  
 
Similarly, the importance of China for exports differs between the south and the north. In 
southern and central Laos, small scale production and informal trade relations have for a 
long time been directed towards Thailand and Vietnam. For instance, much of the surplus 
from small scale farming along the Mekong river (live animals, rice, fruits and 
vegetables) is eventually exported to Thailand. While these household-based activities 
are still important for the aggregate economy, they have gradually been overshadowed by 
more explicitly export oriented production. This includes large scale plantation 
agriculture – rubber, timber, coffee, sugarcane, and other crops – as well as mining and 
electricity generation. The products from small farms in southern Laos are rarely (if ever) 
exported to China, unlike industrial commodities like timber, rubber, and minerals.  
 
The differences between these categories of exports are largely explained by transaction 
costs and scale of production. The weak market infrastructure – in particular, the 
underdeveloped transport network – means that the transaction costs for exporting from 
southern or central Laos to China are very much higher than the costs for exporting to the 
neighboring countries. Moreover, these costs are more or less fixed: the necessary 
expenses for shipping commodities to China are largely independent of transaction 
volume (up to some limit), since there are few standardized transport services available 
for small-scale transactions. To be able to cover the higher costs for trade with China, it is 
therefore necessary to operate at a relatively large scale. Large scale plantations and 
mines – or sectors with efficient intermediaries or middlemen that can collect goods from 
many small producers – will be able to sell to distant customer, small farmers will not.  
 
In northern Laos, by contrast, transaction costs are lower and it is possible also for small 
farmers to participate in trade with China. The lower costs are partly due to the shorter 
distance to China, but also related to the presence of Chinese contractors and investors 
operating on the Lao side of the border (which in turn is explained by geographic 
proximity). By encouraging local farmers to produce commodities demanded in China 
  15and collecting produce at the farm gate or at local markets – sometimes also providing 
credits and seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs – these intermediaries are able to reduce 
both transaction costs and perceived risk for individual farmers. There is also some 
border trade with Thailand, but weaker relations with Vietnam because of poor transport 
infrastructure and low population density in the border areas. Because the general level of 
development in northern Laos is lower than in the south, it is also notable that the north 
has until recently received few large scale investments in plantations, mines and 
hydropower in comparison with the south. During the past few years, this picture has 
slowly begun to change, as a result of significant Chinese investments in plantation 
agriculture: Chinese investors have been granted large land concessions for various crops, 
ranging from rice to rubber. There are also plans for investments in mining and 
hydroelectricity in the northern provinces, but the existing production capacity in these 
sectors is limited (with the exception of some small-scale mining for rubies and gold).  
 
These differences between the north and the south make it interesting to look more 
closely at how the links with China affect development in the two parts of the country.  
 
Most of northern Laos is classified as mountainous and poorly suited to agricultural use. 
Deforestation is a serious problem because of the common practice of swidden 
agriculture and productivity has traditionally been low in comparison with the lowland 
areas along the Mekong river. Increased population and government land use regulations 
have limited the acreage available for swidden agriculture during the past decades, 
reducing fallow periods and contributing to accelerated soil erosion – this has further 
reduced productivity. As a result of its weaker agricultural potential, northern Laos has 
traditionally been poorer than other parts of the country. Table 3 shows how the poverty 
incidence (i.e. the share of the population living below the poverty line) has changed in 
the different regions of the country between 1992/93 and 2002/03: the years noted in 
Table 3 are chosen because they mark comprehensive living standard and expenditure 
surveys, which provide detailed information for the calculation of poverty rates. The 
northern provinces exhibit the highest poverty rates at all three points in time, whereas 
  16the southern provinces are in a somewhat stronger position. However, the rate of poverty 
reduction has been higher in the north, particularly since 1997/98. 
 
Table 3. Poverty incidence in Lao PDR 1992/93-2002/03, per region 
 
Region 1992/93  1997/98  2002/03 
Northern 51.6  47.3  37.9 
Central 45.0  39.4  35.4 
Southern 45.7  39.8  32.6 
Vientiane municipality  33.6  13.5  16.7 
Laos total  46.0  39.1  33.5 
Source: Andersson et al. (2007), Table 2.  
 
Because of the higher poverty rates, northern Laos has been a priority target for both the 
government and international donor agencies in their work to improve development 
conditions and reduce poverty in the country. Recent aid efforts have focused on 
introducing cash crops to replace opium and swidden cultivation in the highland 
communities, in order to establish more sustainable agricultural practices and assisting 
livelihood security. However, since the late 1990s, market forces have arguably had even 
stronger effects on the process of structural change. Improved road links to Yunnan 
province in China (and to a lesser extent to Thailand) have boosted demand for 
agriculture commodities and stimulated a shift away from subsistence agriculture, 
towards commercial farming, with positive effects on rural livelihoods.  
 
Sugar and rubber have emerged as two of the most important cash crops in northern Laos 
as a result of this process. Cultivation of sugar cane started in the mid-1990s with a small 
number of households planting sugarcane. However, initial problems with transporting 
the crop to markets due weak infrastructure led to financial losses for the farmers. Since 
the turn of the millennium, sugar is mainly produced on contract basis for Chinese 
intermediaries, but under supervision by districts offices. Usually sugar contracts allocate 
30 percent of the net revenue to the Chinese investors and 70 percent to the growers. The 
Chinese investors provide sugar seedlings, fencing wire, and fertilizer. The costs of input 
materials are deducted before net revenue is divided.  
 
  17Rubber plantations follow a similar pattern, with Chinese intermediaries promoting 
contract farming by providing seedlings, fertilizers, and credits to villagers. The 
investment in planting rubber trees is a long-term undertaking, which requires at least 8 
years until the first harvest. Since the boom in the northern Lao rubber sector only began 
around the turn of the millennium and accelerated from around 2005, it is still too early to 
determine how successful or profitable it will be. A particular concern is that rubber trees 
are sensitive to cold weather at the same time as wide areas in northern Lao tend to be 
exposed to frost with intervals of approximately 10 years.  
 
The demand from China has also affected many other crops. The production of maize, 
watermelon, capsicum, and other fruits and vegetables has increased notably, as has the 
production of paddy rice. This has largely been possible because production of upland 
rice for subsistence has fallen, as lands used in shifting cultivation are increasingly used 
for market-oriented production. Stressing the novelty of commercial farming, 
Thongmanivong and Fujita (2006) note that crop selection has been remarkably variable 
since the late 1990s, as farmers have experimented with different varieties of cash crops 
and adjusted their production to fluctuating export prices. They also note that agricultural 
land itself has become a commodity. During the dry season, some Lao farmers rent their 
paddy fields to Chinese farmers, who grow watermelon and other vegetables during 5-6 
months, and return to China with their produce after the harvest. The increasing number 
of land concessions reported during the past few years is also a clear sign of the fact that 
land is becoming an increasingly important asset. 
 
In addition to the boom in commercial farming, there has also been an increase in the 
exploitation of non-timber forest products like bamboo, rattan, tree fruit, broom grass, 
and medicinal or fragrant plants. Apart from their use for subsistence needs, these 
products are important sources of income for the local population, especially in the 
uplands. Some of the most important commercial plant species are cardamom and palm 
nuts. Several species of bamboo shoot are collected throughout the northern region, 
processed locally, and exported to both Thailand and China. Moreover, the increasing 
contacts with China, which have largely developed as a result of the Northern Economic 
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and transit trade have increased, bringing investments in various service industries, and 
light manufacturing industry has also expanded. Recent industrial developments include 
Chinese-owned motorcycle and cigarette lighter factories and battery production in 
Oudomxai (Andersson et al. 2007; Lyttleton et al. 2004). 
 
Although these developments are clearly visible on the ground, they are difficult to 
document given the lack of systematic data on small scale production and informal trade 
in Laos. Yet, there is evidence from case studies confirming that commercial agricultural 
in northern Laos began to expand from the late 1990s. For instance, Thongmanivong and 
Fujita (2006) report a notable reduction in shifting agriculture and an increase in 
permanent agriculture in the four northern provinces Bokeo, Luang Namtha, Oudomxay, 
and Luang Prabang already during the second half of the 1990s, as well as rapid increases 
in cash crop production. Lyttleton et al. (2004) examine developments in some villages in 
Luang Namtha, and emphasize the importance of improved road infrastructure – in 
particular, the construction of a road link between China and Thailand, passing through 
the province – for economic development. Table 4 shows both how agricultural exports 
to China from the Muang Sing district in Luang Namtha, which was the main target of 
their study, were growing rapidly in 2001-2003, and how the relative importance of 
different crops varied between the two growing seasons. 
 
Table 4. Value of agricultural exports, Muang Sing district, 2001/01-2002/03 (millon 
KIP)  
 
Export product  Destination  2001/02  2002/03 
Rice China 3870  3000 
Maize China  3750  13000 
Garlic China  240  150 
Sugar cane  China  1120  2844 
Livestock Thailand  176  173 
Firewood China  16  -- 
Watermelon China  1280  -- 
Cardamom China  105  -- 
Bark China  112  -- 
Grass Thailand  450  -- 
Capsicum China  --  600 
Total   11119  19767 
Source: Lyttleton et al (2004).  
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More recent information on export licenses from the northern provinces Luang Namtha 
and Oudomxay in 2006-2007 (see Table 5) also highlight the fact that China is the main 
export destination and that agricultural commodities account for a high share of exports. 
An important caveat is that these figures refer to export licenses rather than actual trade. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare these figures with actual trade volumes, since 
official data are incomplete: for instance, UNDP (2006) reports that almost none of the 
agricultural exports from the northern provinces in 2005-2006 were registered in official 
statistics.  
 
Table 5. Export licenses from Luang Namtha and Oudomxay in 2006/07 (9 months) 
 
Luang Namtha  USD  Oudomxay  USD 
Exports to China  4,550,593 Exports to China  4,747,629 
Wood and processed wood  99,618 Agricultural products  3,453,986 
Forest products  72,942 Wood products  171,918 
Agricultural products  2,474,525 Processed wood  1,071,070 
Buffalos 26,250 Other  50,655 
Gold 513,855    
Rubies 1,363,403    
Exports to Vietnam  2,745 Exports to Vietnam  837,845 
Agricultural products  2,745 Wheat flour   764,981 
   Flowers  53,618 
   Soy  beans  19,247 
Exports to Thailand  1,660,328 Exports to Thailand  -- 
Wood and processed wood  21,569    
Forest products  219,181    
Agricultural products  10,045    
Rubies 1,409,533    
Total 6,213,666 Total 5,585,474 
Source: Data provided by Department of Export and Import, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry Lao PDR. 
 
The structure of trade in southern Laos differs in several ways from that in the north. One 
notable point is that the south has not experienced any boom in agricultural exports 
comparable to that in the north. Farmers in southern Laos do export various commodities 
to Thailand and Vietnam, but their exports have developed gradually and have not been 
strongly affected by recent infrastructure projects that have opened up new markets in the 
neighboring countries. Moreover, the commodities from small farms in Laos are not very 
competitive in comparison with products from Vietnam and Thailand, with a few 
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position in the global market. Another difference is that large firms have a more 
dominant position in the southern part of the country. An increasing share of agricultural 
exports comes from large plantations rather than small farms – this is true even for the 
coffee sector, which used to be based on small-scale production. The mining and 
hydropower industries, which hold a large share of total exports from southern Laos, are 
of course also based on large enterprises. The Sepon mining complex, which is the largest 
site for copper and gold mining in Laos, is located in Savannaketh in the southern part of 
the country, and several other mines for limestone, tin, and gypsum are found in the 
neighboring provinces. Including projects under construction, the country’s hydropower 
capacity is evenly divided between the southern and central parts of the country – so far, 
the northern provinces only have marginal investments. 
 
The development in the coffee sector can be used to illustrate the changing character of 
export agriculture in southern Laos. Coffee was first introduced to Laos by the colonial 
French in the early 1900s. Production is concentrated in and around the Bolaven Plateau 
in the south, which has the most suitable conditions for growing coffee. The industry was 
weak until the 1980s, when the government encouraged lowland farmers to start coffee 
production: coffee was used to repay debt to the Soviet block and Vietnam. Coffee 
production was mainly carried out by small farmers, with the government acting as a 
coordinator for the collection and export of the coffee. In the mid-1990s, the government 
began to encourage private sector investment in coffee production. Coffee was promoted 
as an export commodity to diversify exports and many private investors entered coffee 
trading during the mid-1990s when the world market prices reached record levels. As a 
result, total production volume grew by a factor of five during the 1990s. Thanks to the 
good physical conditions for coffee cultivation, Lao coffee is known for its high quality, 
and Europe has remained the main export destination even after the collapse of the Soviet 
block: Germany and France are the most important individual export markets.  
 
Until the first half of the 2000s, Lao coffee producers could be divided into three 
categories: small plantations with an area of 4-10 hectares, smalll farmers growing coffee 
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with a variable area for coffee production as a source of supplementary income when 
coffee prices were high. The individual farmers were generally not in direct contact with 
the market, but relied on pick-up agents, who bought coffee from farmers and sold to 
wholesalers and exporters, who delivered the green beans to their foreign customers. 
Each of the links in the value chain were clearly separated: the farmers cultivated the 
coffee, pick-up agents collected the coffee and transported it to wholesalers, and the 
wholesalers and exporters secured the necessary documents relating to country of origin 
and phytosanitary status of the coffee shipment. Roasting, milling, and packaging for the 
consumer market were done by the foreign customers. Since then, the Lao coffee industry 
has changed substantially.  
 
In 2002 the world market for coffee fell dramatically, hurting all participants in the value 
chain of coffee. It was obvious that a continued focus on exporting green unroasted beans 
would make Laos vulnerable to world market fluctuations, and that one way to reduce 
vulnerability was upgrading the value chain to include roasting, packaging, and milling. 
However, this would require larger firms that could cover the high fixed costs for 
essential investments in technology and equipment. By 2005, several large-scale 
producers had indeed emerged in the industry. Apart from growing coffee on plantations 
that measure 100-200 hectares, they buy large amounts of coffee from surrounding 
smaller farms, and dry, roast, mill and package the coffee on site. The fact that they 
control a larger share of the value chain has made it possible to upgrade the quality of the 
coffee itself (e.g. by controlling irrigation and fertilizer and pesticide use). The stricter 
quality control has trickled down to the smaller suppliers as well, since procurement 
prices vary depending on the quality of the coffee delivered to the large firms.  
 
The increase in quality has been particularly important for branding, which is not limited 
to the export market. New brands and differentiated roasts have been introduced also for 
the domestic urban markets, and a wide range of new variants are now available at local 
markets and supermarkets in Pakse, Savannahkhet and Vientiane. While coffee is still a 
relatively rare example of an agricultural industry that has been able to raise the value 
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local firms are gradually moving upwards in the value added chain, where production is 
becoming increasingly complex, and where large firms firms become more important 
actors. This process has reached further in southern Laos than in the northern parts of the 
country, as indicated by the higher average income level in the south.  
 
4. Effects on development and poverty reduction 
Both the northern and southern parts of Laos have been able to benefit from the 
opportunities created by the economic reforms and the increasing outward orientation of 
the Lao economy during the past decades, despite the differences in initial development 
levels and economic structures. In the northern parts of the country, growth has largely 
been driven by integration with China. While the ultimate driving force for this 
development may be strong Chinese demand for raw materials, the growth of both formal 
and informal trade has been facilitated by trade liberalization and infrastructure 
development. In particular, the Northern Economic Corridor has been important for 
reducing the transaction costs in trade between Laos and China. In the southern parts of 
the country, growth is related to larger-scale exploitation of natural resources. This 
includes agricultural commodities and wood and wood products, where the production 
structure is more concentrated than in the north, as well as mining and hydropower, 
where large fixed costs necessitate a large scale of operations. China appears among the 
export destinations for the larger producers in southern Laos, but does not have the 
dominant position it enjoys in the north – Thailand and Vietnam are more important trade 
partners. 
 
Table 6 shows how the average annual per capita consumption developed in the different 
regions of the country between 1997/98 and 2002/03, when comprehensive household 
surveys were undertaken in Laos. All major regions recorded higher per capita 
consumption during the period, in spite of the effects of the Asian crisis that erupted in 
1997. Vientiane municipality, which is strongly integrated with the Thai economy, was 
an exception: the losses from the high inflation that was created by the macroeconomic 
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consumption growth rate was recorded in the southern parts of the country, but also the 
northern provinces managed to generate a growth rate above the national average. 
 
Table 6. Average annual growth rates of per capita consumption 1997/98-2002/03 
(per cent) 
 
Region  North  Central  South  Vientiane M  Lao PDR 
Growth rate  1.2 %  0.5 %  1.7 %  -0.4 %  0.8 % 
Source: Andersson et al. (2007), Table 1. 
 
However, growth has been distributed very differently in the northern and southern parts 
of the country. The main characteristic of the development in the north has arguably been 
that it is “inclusive”: the transaction costs for trade with China have been low, and many 
actors – even small households with limited access to land, capital, and education – have 
been able to take part in the expanding market economy. The economy of southern Laos 
is more developed and the role of informal border trade for economic growth is limited. 
Growth is instead generated by interactions with more distant trade partners – relatively 
large shipments of coffee, wood products, and minerals are sold to the world market 
rather than to customers just across the border. The main actors in this development are 
large firms rather than small farms and households.  
 
In Table 3 above, it was noted that incidence of poverty was higher in the northern parts 
of the country, at the same time as the rate of poverty reduction was faster. Figure 5 
presents a growth incidence curve for the northern region, and confirms that growth was 
indeed biased in favor of the poorer population groups. The horizontal axis shows the 
households in the northern provinces according to their consumption percentile, with the 
richest households on the far right. The vertical axis shows the aggregate increase in 
consumption between 1997/87 and 2002/03. On average, consumption grew by about 16 
percent over the period. It is interesting and remarkable that the initially poorest 
households increased their consumption most, while the households that exhibited the 
highest consumption levels in 1997/98 recorded the weakest development: for the richest 
percentiles, there was actually a decline in consumption. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Lao Expenditure and Consumption 
Surveys.  
 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding data for the southern parts of the country. The average 
aggregate increase in consumption was much higher than in the north, at over 50 percent, 
but the distribution across households was very different: richer households grew faster.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Lao Expenditure and Consumption 
Surveys.  
 
  25With the exception of the poorest percentiles and the richest decile, consumption growth 
in the south was higher the higher the household’s initial income and consumption level. 
This supports the argument that the main beneficiaries of the high economic growth in 
southern Laos were relatively affluent households with access to land, capital, and 
education. In other words, economic growth in the south resulted in increasing income 
and consumption gaps and higher inequality. However, it is important to note that even 
the poorest percentiles in the southern parts of the country experienced relatively high 
increases consumption. 
 
Contrasting the experiences of northern and southern Lao PDR’s relations with China, it 
is tempting to make a strong distinction between the two kinds of processes seen during 
the period 1997/1998 – 2002/03. The developments in northern Laos can be characterized 
in terms of economic integration. The prices for many commodities in China are higher 
than in Laos, and the possibilities to export to China have recently improved thanks to 
formal trade liberalization and improvements in transport infrastructure. Since the 
transaction costs for trade with China are low, it is possible for most farms and 
households to participate in and to benefit from trade with China. Developments in 
southern Laos, by contrast, can be described as internationalization. The international 
prices – or Chinese prices – for many commodities are higher than the local prices, but 
the transaction costs are also high because the customers are far away. This means that 
growth is concentrated to sectors with relatively large firms that are able to spread the 
fixed transaction costs across a high volume of output. In northern Laos, trade appears to 
have a pro-poor bias, since even small firms and households can profitably sell their 
produce to Chinese customers. Although the overall rate of growth is lower than in 
southern Laos, there is a stronger positive impact on poverty reduction. In southern Laos, 
trade seems to raise income gaps, since the main beneficiaries are individuals and firms 
that already have access to land, capital, and education. Yet, there is also a positive 
impact on poverty reduction: even the poorer population groups seem to benefit from 
increasing internationalization. 
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necessary to take into account initial income levels. The positive impact of trade with 
China in northern Laos is not only due to the fact that trade costs are low, but also related 
to the low initial development level. The increasing demand from China has made a big 
impact partly because the economy of northern Laos was so weakly developed until the 
mid-1990s, when commercial relations between the two countries began to accelerate. 
Trade with China has contributed to a shift from subsistence farming to small-scale 
commercial agriculture, which has resulted in gains from international trade as well as 
gains from market orientation and specialization at the household level. Many of these 
gains had already been realized in the southern parts of Laos by the mid-1990s – in fact, 
the higher income and development levels in the south were partly due to established 
trade links with Thailand and Vietnam. Further growth and development has required a 
concentration of economic activity to larger units, as well as stronger focus on both 
human and physical capital. In this perspective, the distinction between northern and 
southern Laos is perhaps a more generic description of how economies at different stages 
of development can benefit from international trade. This notwithstanding, China plays a 
very different role for development in the two parts of the country. In the north, it is the 
main market and engine of growth; in the south, it is one among several foreign partners.  
 
5. Concluding comments 
This paper has examined trade policy, trade, and FDI in Lao PDR, with particular 
emphasis on the relations with China. The main findings and arguments of the paper are 
easily summarized in three points.  
•  Laos has gradually gone through a trade liberalization process that has contributed 
to substantial increases in exports, imports, and FDI during the past decade.  
•  China has not been a major destination for formal exports, although its 
importance for imports and FDI has increased in recent years. Only a few percent 
of official exports have directed to China (although there are substantial informal 
exports to China from the northern parts of Laos). The substantial inflows of 
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that the importance of China as an export destination will increase in the future.  
•  The character and effects of trade with China are distinctly different in the 
northern and southern parts of the country. Demand from China has contributed to 
a shift from subsistence agriculture to commercial farming in the north, and 
helped reduce poverty in the least developed parts of Laos: the costs for trading 
with China have been low, and even poor households have been able to benefit 
from trade opportunities. Because of higher transaction costs (mainly due to weak 
transport infrastructure), only a few larger firms from southern Laos have been 
engaged in exports to China. To benefit from these exports, it has been 
increasingly important to have access to human and physical capital. Exports from 
southern Laos have also contributed to poverty reduction, but the main benefits 
have accrued to individuals and households that were initially relatively wealthy. 
 
The differences between the northern and southern parts of the country are interesting, 
because they reflect two different types of relations to the Chinese market. In the north, 
local markets are becoming increasingly integrated with the Chinese market, and the low 
transaction costs for trade with China mean that the effects are widely dispersed across 
the regional economy. In the south, China is considered a distant trade partner that is 
mainly of interest for some sectors where Laos holds strong comparative advantages. 
While the experiences of northern Laos are probably hard to replicate elsewhere (except 
perhaps in some of the other weakly developed countries bordering on China), the 
situation in southern Laos may be similar to that in many other developing countries. 
China is an important potential market for some commodities, but substantial investment 
is required to realize this potential and the benefits will not be distributed equally across 
the population.  
 
The distinction between the north and the south is also related to the initial development 
levels in the two regions. At the very early stages of development, it may be possible to 
generate conditions for “inclusive” growth, where large shares of the population are able 
to benefit from higher prices for agricultural export goods that are produced as a 
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for a shift towards higher value added activities that require human and physical capital. 
Since these assets are not likely to be equally distributed among the population, neither 
are the benefits of trade and growth. This distinction suggests that the situation in 
northern Laos will gradually become more similar to that in southern Laos: once the 
benefits from the first round of integration with China are realized, further gains will 
require more physical and human capital as well as larger firms.  
 
A notable similarity between northern and southern Laos is that both parts of the country 
are influenced in a similar way by imports from China. The abundant supply of cheap 
consumer and capital goods from Chinese (and Thai) producers will hold back the 
development of a domestic manufacturing industry: it will be difficult for Lao producers 
to compete with Chinese firms that can build their competitiveness on a large domestic 
market where both human capital and cheap unskilled labor are plentiful. The changes in 
the Lao coffee sector, where local firms have gradually been able to upgrade their 
production and move up the value chain, illustrate a feasible development path also for 
other resource based industries in Laos.  
 
It is likely that many other developing countries will find themselves in a similar position 
vis-à-vis China in the future: while there are ample opportunities to benefit from 
commodity exports to China, there is also tough competition that limits the short-run 
growth potential in many labor-intensive manufacturing industries. With increasing 
wages and a gradual reduction of the Chinese surplus of unskilled labor – largely driven 
by demographic factors – there may in the long run be new opportunities in labor 
intensive industry for other developing countries, but the short run strategies of many 
countries should probably focus on gradual upgrading of resource based industries.  
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1 Apart from the goods in the Inclusion List that are subject to tariff reductions, each 
member country also has the right to place a small number of products in a Highly 
Sensitive List and a General Exception List. The tariffs on these products – e.g. rice, 
which is typically considered a sensitive commodity – are allowed to remain higher. See 
http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm. 
 
2 The data on imports by most of the trade partners of Lao PDR are recorded in the UN 
Comtrade database. Laos is not included as a reporter in Comtrade because of problems 
with data availability and quality. 
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